综合智慧能源 ›› 2023, Vol. 45 ›› Issue (11): 62-69.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.2097-0706.2023.11.008

• 电力经济与市场交易 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于势博弈的负荷聚合商日前市场动态定价模型

梅文卿1(), 刘晓峰1,*(), 王嘉诚1(), 谭梦玲2   

  1. 1.南京师范大学 电气与自动化工程学院,南京 210023
    2.国网九江供电公司, 江西 九江 332099
  • 收稿日期:2023-02-27 修回日期:2023-07-05 出版日期:2023-11-25
  • 通讯作者: * 刘晓峰(1991),男,讲师,硕士生导师,博士,从事需求响应、博弈论、电力市场等方面的研究, liuxiaofeng@njnu.edu.cn
    * 刘晓峰(1991),男,讲师,硕士生导师,博士,从事需求响应、博弈论、电力市场等方面的研究, liuxiaofeng@njnu.edu.cn
    * 刘晓峰(1991),男,讲师,硕士生导师,博士,从事需求响应、博弈论、电力市场等方面的研究, liuxiaofeng@njnu.edu.cn
  • 作者简介:梅文卿(1999),男,在读硕士研究生,从事博弈论、电力市场等方面的研究,1065793928@qq.com
    王嘉诚(2000),男,在读硕士研究生,从事电动汽车与碳排放等方面的研究,1204292675@qq.com
  • 基金资助:
    江苏省高等学校基础科学(自然科学)研究面上项目(23KJB470020)

A day-ahead market pricing model for load aggregators based on potential game

MEI Wenqing1(), LIU Xiaofeng1,*(), WANG Jiacheng1(), TAN Mengling2   

  1. 1. School of Electrical and Automation Engineering, Nanjing Normal University, Nanjing 210023,China
    2. State Grid Jiujiang Electric Power Supply Company, Jiujiang 332099,China
  • Received:2023-02-27 Revised:2023-07-05 Published:2023-11-25
  • Supported by:
    Fundamental Science (Natural Science) Research Program of Universities and Colleges in Jiangsu Province(23KJB470020)

摘要:

随着居民用电量的不断提高,新型电力系统加速构建,需求响应成为保障上级电网安全稳定的重要手段,系统对需求侧的重视程度大幅提高。负荷聚合商作为上级电网和用户之间的协调机构,发挥着越来越重要的作用。为促进负荷聚合商日前投标市场的稳定性并提高用户参与需求响应的积极性,将参与需求响应的负荷资源作为广义需求侧资源,提出基于价格激励的需求响应机制,引入博弈理论及势博弈概念,建立上级电网、负荷聚合商和用户的分层交易模型。首先,根据用户的响应机制及日前市场的投标价格机制建立用户和负荷聚合商的收益模型;随后,建立各负荷聚合商之间的非合作博弈模型,通过构建势函数将原来的多目标优化问题转换为单目标凸二次规划问题,能够短时间内收敛至纳什均衡且对大规模需求响应仍能保持收敛性。算例分析表明,该模型可在提高负荷聚合商利润的同时提升用户的收益。

关键词: 新型电力系统, 需求响应, 电力市场, 非合作博弈, 势博弈, 负荷聚合商, 日前市场投标, 纳什均衡

Abstract:

As residential electricity consumption continues to increase and new power systems are under construction, demand response has become an important means to ensure the safety and stability of the superior power grid,and higher requirements on demand side are proposed by the power grid. Load aggregators play an increasingly important role as the intermediary between the system and users. To keep the stability of the aggregators' day-ahead bidding market and motivate users to participate in demand response, the load resources participating in demand response are taken as generalized demand-side resources. Then, a demand response mechanism based on price incentives is proposed, and a hierarchical trading model including the superior grid, load aggregators and users is established based on game theory and potential game. The revenue models of users and load aggregators are made based on the user response mechanism and day-ahead market bidding mechanism. The models can simplify the multi-objective optimization problem to single-objective convex quadratic programming problems through function construction. The proposed algorithm can converge to Nash equilibria in a short time and maintain the convergence under large-scale demand responses. Proven by the practical cases, the proposed model can improve the profit of load aggregators and the revenue of users at the same time.

Key words: new power system, demand response, electrical power market, non-cooperative game, potential game, load aggregator, day-ahead market bidding, Nash equilibrium

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