Evolutionary game behavior and decision-making between power generation companies and power grid companies under the agent purchasing mechanism in bidding process

doi:10.3969/j.issn.2097-0706.2023.11.006

Abstract

Abstract:

Based on the roles of power grid enterprises playing in the power market and the game between two power supply enterprises， a three-party evolutionary game model for heterogeneous enterprises and power grid in power purchasing mode is established under which the supply exceeds the demand. Since the information asymmetry of the sellers and purchasers，both sides follow compensation mechanisms to minimize their own risks and maximized their benefits. The game behaviors of the bidding in the electricity market are analyzed under two bidding mechanisms： market clearing price （MCP） and pay-as-bid （PAB）. The research findings are as follows： Under MCP mechanism， the three-party game system takes two evolutionarily stable strategies （ESSs） for bidding immune to compensation. Changing the compensation coefficient only affects the path of convergences to different ESSs. Under PAB mechanism， adjusting the compensation coefficient leads to different ESSs， the price of electricity under the PAB mechanism is lower than that under the MCP mechanism under certain conditions.

Key words: evolutionary game theory, power market, bidding, agent electricity purchasing, homogeneity and heterogeneity, evolutionarily stable strategy, compensation mechanism

CLC Number:

TK01:F42

CHENG Lefeng, PENG Pan, CHEN Dongli. Evolutionary game behavior and decision-making between power generation companies and power grid companies under the agent purchasing mechanism in bidding process[J]. Integrated Intelligent Energy, 2023, 45(11): 45-54.

Figures/Tables 10

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发电企业策略		电网企业策略
B	A	z	1-z
x	y	{bq₂-U₁，b(Q-q₂)，U+U₁}	{b(Q-q₁)，bq₁-U₂，U+U₂}
x	1-y	{b(Q-q₁)+U₃，bq₁，U-U₃}	{b(Q-q₁)，bq₁，U}
1-x	y	{bq₂，b(Q-q₂)，U}	{bq₂，b(Q-q₂)+U₄，U-U₄}
1-x	1-y	{aq₂-U₅，a(Q-q₂)，U+U₅+(b-a)Q}	{a(Q-q₁)，aq₁-U₆，U+U₆+(b-a)Q}

均衡点 (x，y，z)	雅克比矩阵特征值				演化稳定性
均衡点 (x，y，z)	λ₁	λ₂	λ₃	实部符号	演化稳定性
A₁(0，0，0)	U₅-U₆	(b-a)(Q-q₁)	U₄+U₆+Qb-aq₁-bq₂	，+，	不稳定
A₂(0，0，1)	U₆-U₅	(b-a)(Q-q₂)	U₅+U₃+bQ -aq₂-bq₁	，+，	不稳定
A₃(0，1，0)	U₄	b(Q-q₁-q₂)	aq₁-U₆-Qb-U₄+bq₂	+，-，*	不稳定
A₄(0，1，1)	-U₁	-U₄	(a-b) (Q-q₂)	-，-，-	ESS
A₅(1，0，0)	-U₂	-U₃	(a-b)(Q-q₁)	-，-，-	ESS
A₆(1，0，1)	U₃	b(Q-q₁-q₂)	aq₂-Qb-U₃-U₅+bq₁	+，-，*	不稳定
A₇(1，1，0)	U₂	U₁-U₂	b(q₁-Q+q₂)	+，*，+	不稳定
A₈(1，1，1)	U₁	U₂-U₁	b(q₁-Q+q₂)	+，*，+	不稳定

发电企业策略		电网企业策略
B	A	z	1-z
x	y	{bq₂-U₁，b(Q-q₂)，U+U₁}	{b(Q-q₁)，bq₁-U₂，U+U₂}
x	1-y	{b(Q-q₁)+U₃，aq₁，U-U₃+q₁(b-a)}	{b(Q-q₁)，bq₁，U+q₁(b-a)}
1-x	y	{aq₂，b(Q-q₂)，U+q₂(b-a)}	{aq₂，b(Q-q₂)+U₄，U-U₄+q₂(b-a)}
1-x	1-y	{aq₂-U₅，a(Q-q₂)，U+U₅+(b-a)Q}	{a(Q-q₁)，aq₁-U₆，U+U₆+(b-a)Q}

均衡点 (x，y，z)	雅克比矩阵特征值				演化稳定结论
均衡点 (x，y，z)	λ₁	λ₂	λ₃	实部符号	演化稳定结论
B₁(0，0，0)	U₅-U₆	(b-a)(Q-q₁)	U₄+U₆+Qb-aq₁-bq₂	+，+，*	不稳定
B₂(0，0，1)	U₆-U₅	(b-a)(Q-q₂)	U₅+U₃+bQ -aq₂-bq₁	-，+，*	不稳定
B₃(0，1，0)	U₄	b(Q-q₁)-aq₂	aq₁-U₆-Qb-U₄+bq₂	+，，	不稳定
B₄(0，1，1)	-U₄	(b-a)q₂-U₁	(a-b) (Q-q₂)	-，*，-	—
B₅(1，0，0)	-U₃	(b-a)q₁-U₂	(a-b)(Q-q₁)	-，*，-	—
B₆(1，0，1)	U₃	b(Q-q₂)-aq₁	aq₂-Qb-U₃-U₅+bq₁	+，-，*	不稳定
B₇(1，1，0)	U₁-U₂	U₂+q₁(a-b)	aq₂+b(q₁-Q)	，，*	不稳定
B₈(1，1，1)	U₂-U₁	U₁+q₂(a-b)	aq₁+b(q₂-Q)	，，*	—