Coordinated false data injection attacks against distributed economic dispatch of electricity-gas integrated energy system

doi:10.3969/j.issn.2097-0706.2025.11.008

Abstract

Abstract:

Multi-energy flow scheduling utilizes information technology to break down the barriers between traditional energy systems， thereby forming an efficient and complementary energy supply system. However， the transmission of a large amount of measurement and control data between energy systems also increases their risk of being subjected to cyberattacks. To clarify the potential attack patterns of false data injection attacks （FDIA） in integrated energy systems （IES）， a distributed scheduling-oriented modeling method for coordinated FDIA in the electricity-gas system was proposed. This method considered the influence of different management entities of electricity and gas in the IES， and established a distributed bilevel programming model. Additionally， it designed a bilevel nested distributed solution framework by integrating the alternating direction method of multipliers， protecting the privacy of data from each entity. Meanwhile， convex relaxation techniques were used to transform the Weymouth equation in the natural gas system into a tractable convex constraint form， facilitating the efficient solution of the model. Tests were conducted in an electricity-gas IES interconnected with the IEEE 39-bus and the Belgian 20-bus systems. The results showed that the destructive effect of the coordinated FDIA could be transmitted through coupling devices in the system， forcing the system to shed nearly 70% of the load. Meanwhile， the distributed solution algorithm could converge within a limited number of iterations， and the relative error compared with the centralized method was controlled within 1.4%. The proposed method provides an effective tool for analyzing the attack patterns of FDIA in IES under distributed architectures

Key words: integrated energy system, coordinated false data injection attacks, distributed solving algorithm, bilevel programming, convex relaxation, multi-energy flow scheduling

CLC Number:

TK01：TM73

FAN Yuxin, LI Yongming, SU Lei. Coordinated false data injection attacks against distributed economic dispatch of electricity-gas integrated energy system[J]. Integrated Intelligent Energy, 2025, 47(11): 87-95.

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攻击节点	原始节点数据^①	攻击后节点数据^②
7	1.51	-0.76
18	3.37	-0.51
25	1.45	-0.72
27	1.82	-0.91
28	1.33	-0.67
39	7.14	3.56

攻击节点	原始节点数据	攻击后节点数据
16	272 000	-136 000
19	272 000	136 000

系统类型	基准切负荷量	攻击后切负荷量
电力系统	0	0
燃气系统	0	3 920 000

发电机组	基准功率	攻击后功率
GT1	548.09	614.98
GT2	652.00	625.00
G1	0	0
G2	725.00	527.78
G3	0	0
G4	0	0
G5	152.33	85.44
G6	0	0
G7	865.00	865.00
G8	1 100.00	1 100.00