Integrated Intelligent Energy ›› 2022, Vol. 44 ›› Issue (9): 71-77.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.2097-0706.2022.09.010

• Technology Exchange • Previous Articles     Next Articles

Mechanism design and operation practice of Zhejiang frequency regulation ancillary service market

TANG Qiwen1(), SHEN Qi2(), ZHU Jun3(), SU Yijing1   

  1. 1. Power Dispatching Control Center of State Grid Zhejiang Electric Power Company Limited,Hangzhou 310007,China
    2. Hangzhou Banshan Power Generation Company Limited,Hangzhou 310060,China
    3. China Three Gorges Construction Engineering Corporation Zhejiang Branch,Hangzhou 310052,China
  • Received:2022-06-02 Revised:2022-08-30 Online:2022-09-25 Published:2022-09-26

Abstract:

Grid-connection of large-scale and high-proportion new energy makes higher requirement on the regulation capacity of power systems. To improve the regulation performance of generators,high-quality frequency regulation resources are introduced into the establishment of Zhejiang frequency regulation ancillary service market. On the premise of satisfying the regulation requirements of the power system,the market mechanism comprehensively considers the electric power market and regulation service cost,aiming to minimize the total regulation cost included the opportunity cost. The clearing mode of the electricity-regulation joint optimization market takes regulation bidding price,opportunity cost and regulation performance index as the determining factors and makes the payment according to the actual regulation contribution and regulation effect. The operation results of Zhejiang frequency regulation market show that the market clearing mechanism plays a positive role in selecting high-quality resources,reducing regulation cost,improving regulation performance and increasing revenue sources. Based on the summary on experience, suggestions on developing and improving the ancillary service market are put forward.

Key words: carbon neutrality, new power system, regulation ancillary service market, grid-connection of new energy, joint optimization, opportunity cost, comprehensive regulation performance index

CLC Number: